prisoners.
1 The number of the POWs quickly exceeded expectations and, by the time the United
States stopped accepting new prisoners in May of 1945, there were more than 600 camps spread throughout 45 of the 48 states. 2 In total, the U.S. government accepted 425,871 Axis prisoners, of which 371,683 were German. 3 The United States had never had so many prisoners. In fact, never in the history of modern warfare had so many prisoners of war been evacuated over such great distances for internment on foreign soil. Master's thesis, 1948, 2. Speakman was a former officer-in-charge of the re-education programs. 5 May, Lowell A., and Mark P. Schock. Prisoners of War in Kansas, 1943 -1946 . Manhattan, KS: KS Publishing, 2007 Conventions detailed how much prisoners should be paid, what types of duties they could be assigned, and standards for their overall conditions and treatment. Since the Conventions had never before been put into action, their application had to be "tested at every step." 8 One such test was conducted at Camp Concordia. The camp possessed 640 acres of land designed to contain housing, mess facilities, recreation, and hospitalization for 1000 officer POWs and 3000 enlisted POWs. 9 The details of the Geneva Conventions' farm labor program applied only to the enlisted men at Camp Concordia and provided for only the voluntary labor of officer POWs. Not surprisingly, very few officers volunteered for anything other than administrative duties. 10 Concordia's officer population continuously expanded, in the latter half of its existence more than doubling, the enlisted soldier population. Because officers could not be forced to work, this imbalance often left the majority of the camp's population idle.
11
To exacerbate the problem, POWs at Concordia arrived shortly after capture and before intensive interrogation. As a consequence, a small number of hardcore Nazi idealogues began to intimidate the mass of POWs, who, although patriotic Germans, were unsympathetic to fascism. 12 This quickly became a problem. A December 1943 inspection report noted that "the prisoners were running their own companies with no American officer assigned to any company.
Most disciplinary action and company administrative policy was handled by prisoners 8 Speakman. themselves." 13 The Geneva Conventions specified that the most senior POW officer present in the camp would be designated the camp spokesman. This prevented any American participation in the selection process and led to the observation of one reporter that the leadership at Concordia was "completely Nazi in character."
14
One serious result was a series of mysterious deaths that occurred in the camp during the fall of 1943. Originally deemed suicides, it was later discovered that the victims had expressed anti-Nazi sentiments and in some cases had already received threats from Nazi sympathizers in the camp. One such incident is described by a columnist as follows:
Captain Felix Tropschuh, 30, suspected by fellow prisoners of giving information concerning a planned escape; Gestapo agents also found in his diary hatred of Nazi ideology; he was therefore "tried" by a Nazi 'court of honor" and expelled from the "German community of fellowship;" he was therefore given a rope and at night Nazis posted themselves outside his door until he hanged himself on October 18, [1943] . Camp Concordia, Kansas. 15 This type of problem was persistent at camps all over America. It was estimated that roughly 25% of camp prisoners were fanatical Nazis, 15% anti-Nazi, and 60% somewhere in between. At the start of the war, vocal anti-Nazis were separated from the others for their own protection, leaving the fanatical Nazis with the majority of the population.
16 Dedicated Nazis were quick to organize in the camps, and any German prisoner who showed interest in democracy or appeared unsympathetic to Nazi ideals ran the risk of retribution from his fellow These prisoners, though Germans, were not Nazis. Of course no German is a Nazi, not now that the vile business has rotted; but these prisoners were never Nazis. Not if our circumspection had half its presumed strength; for we had shifted their records back and forth for many an hour, interviewing them personally and resorting upon occasion to the scientific liedetector, to make certain that these men were what they claimed to be. Many of them, it appeared, had risked more and suffered more in risk against that wrong than had I.
28
There was a certain amount of sympathy felt towards Germans on the part of Americans, who identified with their struggles and wanted them kindly treated. A September 1944 article reported an incident at Fort Riley, Kansas, where "local citizens had complained that farmers' wives mended prisoners' clothing, and made them cakes or cookies for work well done. The climax came yesterday when several women unloaded carloads of prisoners at a branch camp here, following a day of work on nearby farms. One woman drove up with a prisoner holding a child on his lap."
29 This was considered a breach of protocol by the camp commander.
It was not just the American public who entertained the idea of a re-education program.
Originally, the concept of POW re-education was rejected by the Roosevelt administration and The detention in the United States of ever increasing numbers of German prisoners of war creates an unprecedented opportunity. These men will someday be repatriated, and as a group, will have a powerful voice in future German affairs. Their opinions and feelings concerning America may determine, in a large measure, future relations between Germany and the United States. 34 An irresistible opportunity emerged to teach prisoners respect for American ideals, democracy, and especially for American institutions which might "provide a nucleus of democratically-inclined men in post-war Germany who could influence their country towards peaceful democratic solutions in the future."
35 A re-education program was an opportunity for the U.S. government to mitigate the risk that Germans would be swayed against the American Driven by a mixture of evangelism and power politics, altruism and imperialism, a series of privately endowed yet government-sanctioned American colleges sprang up in various corners of the globe ranging from Egypt to India. These educational institutions symbolized what the American political establishment viewed as the fundamental difference between American expansionism and old-world imperialism. Americans sought to enlighten rather than conquer, persuade rather than subdue. Even though the government endorsement of international education was never more than a token reminder of American aspirations, it reflected a widely held assumption that moral influences and persuasion could eliminate the need for naked power in the management of global affairs.
37
Camp Concordia's POW internment on U.S. soil was an opportunity for America to accomplish this task right in its own backyard.
Beyond simply believing that such a program would be beneficial, the U.S. government also believed success was possible in the case of the German POWs. A War Department booklet published for supervisors of German POW laborers suggested that German political deviancy was not the result of irredeemable personality or racial defects, as was the perceived case with the Japanese POWs. Presented with American values, it was the popular consensus that German POWs could conceivably be transformed "from adversaries to disciples." effort. This was partially to avoid being perceived as a blatant attempt at imposing propaganda on prisoners, and partly to guard against the rejection of the program by the POWs themselves, who would surely object to any obvious attempt to reshape their political beliefs.
40
To support the program, re-education proponents pointed to Article 17 of the Geneva
Conventions. This article specified that "belligerents shall encourage as much as possible the organization of intellectual and sporting pursuits by the prisoners of war." The vagueness of the article left much room for interpretation. The basic premise was that instead of discrediting National Socialism, American authorities should simply foster respect for the American alternative. Program staff were warned in a secret memorandum that the plan was not to be "overdone;" POWs were meant to be "democratized" but not "Americanized".
41
The SPD administrators decided that if selected materials for intellectual diversion were made available to the camps, the curiosity of the prisoners concerning the U.S. and its institutions would provide the primary means for their education. 42 A letter from the Adjutant General specified that the purpose of the program was to "create and foster spontaneous responses on the part of the German prisoners of war towards activities and contacts which will encourage an attitude of respect on their part for American institutions, traditions, and ways of life and thought." In short, the program was designed to encourage self-indoctrination.
43 40 Ibid. The program was initially classified secret because Germany might intentionally misunderstand its scope as a pretext for severe retaliation against American prisoners of war. Army leadership considered it undesirable to give the German prisoners of war any knowledge of such a program at a time when Nazi elements in the camps had sufficient power to sabotage the War Department's efforts. 41 Additionally, the American Council on Education was asked to select colleges and universities in assisting with the program. In the summer of 1944 these universities began to support the re-education programs by making available books, educational films, slides and other training aids, and by offering advice in the choice of textbooks and in the organization of courses. These institutions varied from the largest national universities down to junior colleges.
Fourteen universities were selected to provide correspondence courses for prisoners.
45
In order to facilitate the programs at individual camps, the SPD set up nine service commands across the U.S., each administered by a field grade officer. A company grade officer, designated the Assistant Executive Officer (AEO), was assigned to each camp locally to oversee the individual programs. 46 Initially the SPD attempted to fill these AEO jobs with 150 personnel possessing a specific set of criteria, but failed when they discovered that intelligence agencies had already absorbed many of the German-speaking officers. Therefore, instead of handpicking officers to become AEOs, the major commands were instructed to fill quotas, with German language skills listed as a preference rather than a prerequisite. Officers were vetted and sent to a series of training conferences.
47
These AEOs were critical to the SPD's plan because they were charged with administering the program at the local camp level, monitoring the response of the prisoners, and diffusing tensions between the "military-minded" commanders and the "intellectual-minded"
SPD. The architects of the program anticipated the suspicion and resistance the program would arouse among POW camp commanders, many of whom feared that re-education would erode discipline or foster strife among inmates. The SPD hoped the presence of a re-education coordinator would mitigate such fears and protect its investments. Cpt. Teufel was met with an unexpected yet pleasant surprise: there was already an education program, entirely independent of the SPD directed re-education program, which existed at Concordia. In his initial report, Cpt. Teufel remarked that "Probably no other camp in the country was so well organized for such work. Colonel Eggerss had long favored keeping the minds and bodies of his wards occupied, not only for reasons of security, but also in order to 47 Speakman. 52 The German POW population at Concordia, like at most POW camps, was largely comprised of young men whose college education had been interrupted by the war, and many of them wished to resume it as soon as possible.
53
Another influential, unique reason for the initiation of the program was the fact that
Concordia's population, with its heavy preponderance of officer-prisoners was disproportionately well-educated compared to other camps. Cpt. Teufel noted in his report upon arrival at Concordia, Anti-Nazis in enlisted men's camps were proverbially known to the CMP (Corps of Military Police) as weak characters, but this group of officer anti-Nazis was composed of extraordinary men. Two of them had travelled extensively and studied in the United States. All were highly educated, lawyers, teachers, ministers, and similar types of professions which are the more susceptible to the mental training leading toward objectivity. As true Germans, their aim was to assist in every possible way in the respectable regeneration of their fatherland through the destruction of National Socialism. 49 Teufel, History of Camp Concordia. Np. 50 Ibid. 51 Curriculum of the Prisoner of War Camp, Concordia, Kansas. MS, RH MS 240, Spencer Library, Kansas University. 52 Wahl, "Camp Concordia Prisoner of War University." Np. 53 Ibid. A bit fearfully at first, and always secretly, they began to give active assistance to the Assistant Executive Officer.
54
These educated Germans organized the school at Concordia themselves, and independently selected curriculum that was found by SPD representatives to have thirty percent re-education value.
55 These efforts were pursued so diligently that they succeeded despite ever-present Nazi intimidation. Germans were responsible for volunteering to teach, volunteering to be taught, and requesting materials be available to them to accomplish those objectives. 56 Classes were taught by "whoever believed knew so much about a field, knowledge to lecture at a university level, practice or work related, that he could pass the knowledge on to others." 57 There were approximately 175 instructors, including fifty with doctoral degrees and many others with comparable educational attainments. 58 The curriculum they taught at Concordia included approximately 300 subjects, including English, twelve additional languages, electronics, theology, history, geography, government, engineering, medicine, arts, sciences, and vocational subjects. Within a very short time after their arrival, prisoners had constructed an open-air stage and a great deal of time was dedicated to music, the arts, and theater. 54 Teufel, History of Camp Concordia. Np. 55 Ibid. 56 Edwards, "Inspection Report." Germans POWs frequently even purchased books with their own money. 57 Wahl, "Camp Concordia Prisoner of War University." Np. 58 Teufel, History of Camp Concordia. Np.
German POWs from the 47 th Grenadier Band, one many such leisure activities establish by and for the POWs at Concordia.
Once the program began to gain traction, the purchase of teaching materials, textbooks, charts, films, etc. were made on behalf of the German Red Cross, the International Red Cross, and the War Prisoners' Aid of the Y.M.C.A. These materials combined to form a scientific library containing more than 7,000 books covering practically all fields of knowledge.
59
With the authorization of the War Department and in cooperation with the German Red Cross, the Camp Concordia school furthered its legitimacy by creating a partnership with the Complete confidence is felt for the altruism and ability of these two officers. A lesser confidence is felt in the following officers, with whom personal relations have been less close. All others on the list are not personally known to the Commanding Officer at this camp. The security of these men has made it necessary that personal contact be maintained only through those who have official capacities which make them innocently accessible for contacts. Any efforts to personally appraise these others could well place their lives in jeopardy, unless attempted on other premises. 66 Had the cooperation of these men been discovered by their Nazi counterparts, it was a very real possibility that their lives would have been at risk. It was determined that in order for an outright re-education program to be successful, the committed Nazi POWs would need to be removed from the compound. 67 Cpt. Teufel's circle of anti-Nazi allies assisted the Camp leadership by divulging the thoughts and activities of the other POWs on the compound, and by monitoring the Nazis on behalf of the American authorities. This assisted the camp authorities in finding those POWs to be transferred. As a result, more than 100 of the most dedicated SS leaders were removed to a secure camp at Alva, Oklahoma in the spring of 1945. 68 On July 7, 1945, after nearly two years and six semesters of courses, the university at Camp
Concordia was discontinued. Previously offered upper division courses covering a wide range of topics were replaced by a reduced curriculum dedicated to the teaching of English, American History, geography, and civics. 72 The aim of this highly focused new re-education program was to win the prisoners over to a more democratic paradigm and to help them recognize, through their own efforts, the depths to which Nationalist Socialistic doctrine had crippled Germany.  The frank request of the senior German spokesman for guidance in the re-orientation of the younger and more totalitarian-oriented members of the camp  Voluntary purchase of somewhere between 6000 and 8000 books for re-educational purposes, in addition to between 15000 and 18000 of this type already in possession 77  The initiation of a series of lectures on re-educational subjects by the Assistant Executive Officer, the Provost Marshal, and the Post Exchange Officer, at the request of the Germans  Articles composed for the camp newspaper by the Assistant Executive Officer at the request of the Germans  The issuance of more than 4000 certificates of credit to POWs for participation in re-education at the urgent request of the Germans 78 Cpt. Teufel concluded in his report that he believed the programs had encouraged positive change and wrote, "Many…indications of a psychological transformation could be evoked, but space does not permit it. It is sufficient to state that as a result of spontaneous responses on the part of the German prisoners of war and through their own self-indoctrination, Nazism faded out and a growing confidence in America and the democratic way of life began to replace it." 79 program: "Re-education was accomplished through natural means from within, by and for Germans, and as it is felt it will have to be done in Germany. The Assistant Executive Officer merely attempted to guide and advise a German-inspired mental movement."
80
The story of the re-education programs at Camp Concordia, and at German prisoner of war camps throughout the country, is a little-known slice of American history. Both the conditions at Concordia and the extent to which the re-education program was carried out was radically different from anything experienced by other demographics of prisoners. Although prisoners were originally intended to be used only as supplemental labor, the U.S. government, with the prodding of the American public, was quick to realize the full potential of the situation. The institution of the Special Projects Division and subsequent initiation of re-education programs across the country was a massive undertaking and far exceeded the Geneva Conventions' stipulations of encouraging the intellectual pursuits of the prisoners. This was ultimately the case because of the United States' belief in the re-educational potential of the German prisoners and by its increasing interest in participating in the shaping post-war Germany. While the full effects of the re-education programs at Concordia and other POW camps throughout the nation are impossible to measure, it is certain that the United States' attempted re-education of German combatants was felt for many years.
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